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DISUNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Joseph Blocher* 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton’s 51 Imperfect Solutions describes and cele-
brates the crucial role of state constitutional law in “making” American 
constitutional law. The fact that states do not speak with one voice in doing 
so is, in Sutton’s account, a feature rather than a bug. The diversity in their 
approaches permits experimentation and tailoring, and ultimately produces 
a stronger and more supple constitutional fabric.  
Sutton’s enthusiasm for the diversity and dynamism of state constitu-
tional law is infectious. But is the federal alternative quite so flat? Although 
federal constitutional rights are undoubtedly more uniform than those of 
states, they are not identical throughout the nation. The application and 
even definition of federal guarantees varies geographically, sometimes to a 
surprising degree. Moreover, there are reasons to favor some degree of 
disuniformity—some of the same reasons, in fact, that Sutton gives for fo-
cusing on state constitutional law. But the fact of diversity and the strength 
of the arguments in favor of it point to a difficult set of questions: how much 
and what kinds of disuniformity are desirable when it comes to federal con-
stitutional rights? This Essay attempts to sketch a few answers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rarely does the title of a book adequately convey its thesis, especially when 
that thesis is worthy of a book. But in that respect—and in many others—Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton’s 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Con-
stitutional Law1 is exceptional. The title is not only arresting, but invokes many 
of the themes that Sutton engages and which are central to this Symposium: fed-
eralism, diversity, interpretation, and the role of states in a federal constitutional 
system. Those themes in turn raise hard questions. And Sutton’s central argu-
ment is that it is precisely when those questions are hard, and the answers inde-
terminate, that “it may be more appropriate to tolerate fifty-one imperfect solu-
tions rather than to impose one imperfect solution on the country as a whole, 
particularly when imperfection may be something we have to live with in a given 
area.”2 
The kinds of thorny and contested questions that often arise in U.S. consti-
tutional law sometimes seem to cry out for a decentralized, entrepreneurial, ex-
perimental, and localized approach. That description alone evokes archetypal 
American virtues of flexibility, competition, and the like. It is also familiar to 
contrast that approach with a bland, leveling, one-size-fits-all federal alterna-
tive—a contrast often drawn, implicitly or explicitly, in scholarship and in polit-
ical rhetoric alike.3 On the other hand, one might point to the virtues of uni-
formity, especially with regard to rights,4 or the ways in which state and local 
variation can lead to bad outcomes, especially for minority groups.5 
Because I agree with Judge Sutton’s positive account of state constitutional 
law and could add nothing of value to what he has already said in favor of it, I 
will focus in this Essay on one thing about which we partially disagree. Specifi-
cally, I want to focus on the implied comparator in his account: the “one imper-
fect solution.”  
 
 1. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).  
 2. Id. at 19.  
 3. Over the past few decades, that contrast has usually been associated with those on the political right. 
See, e.g., Federalism, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/issue/federalism/ (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2020) (“Real solutions to America’s challenges can be found in the states–America’s fifty laboratories 
of democracy–not in one-size fits all federal government policies that disregard regional differences and local 
community needs.”); Ilya Shapiro, Federalism Wins Supreme Court Jackpot, CATO INST. (May 14, 2018, 11:06 
AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/federalism-wins-supreme-court-jackpot (“It’s insane to think that in a large, plu-
ralistic country like the United States, so many decisions should be made one-size-fits-all in Washington.”). In 
obvious ways and for obvious reasons, the political battle lines have shifted in recent years.  
 4. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1699 
(2010) (“[R]elying on state constitutions never will provide more than partial success in advancing liberties and 
equality because the chance of succeeding in all states, or even most states, is small.”). 
 5. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (2010). 
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Monolithic federal constitutional law is the stalking horse in 51 Imperfect 
Solutions. Sutton argues that the U.S. Supreme Court “cannot, or at least should 
not, premise an interpretation of the National Constitution on the local traditions, 
cultures, or history of one State, one region of the country, or one group of citi-
zens.”6 This descriptive and normative account sets up a sharp contrast with state 
constitutional law, which of course is more diverse and flexible. (That said, and 
as the title of the book implies, Sutton does not seek to divide the two entirely—
he regards both as part of a common enterprise of “American constitutional 
law.”7) 
The basic argument of this Essay is that the contrast is not, and should not 
be, quite so stark. While federal constitutional rights are undoubtedly and 
properly more uniform than state constitutional rights, our federal constitutional 
tradition already exhibits some of the kinds of diversity and nonuniformity that 
Sutton celebrates. Sometimes this is because the federal rules, while applying 
nationwide in an abstract sense, actually permit (and sometimes demand) atten-
tion to local circumstances.8 Race-conscious student assignment plans, for ex-
ample, are uniformly subject to strict scrutiny, but they are constitutional in some 
parts of the country and not in others.9 
In other ways, federal constitutional law is quite explicit in defining rights 
based on “local traditions, cultures, or history.”10 Obscenity doctrine (which Sut-
ton discusses11) is perhaps the clearest example, given its direct incorporation of 
“community standards,”12 which vary significantly. As the Supreme Court put it 
in Miller v. California, “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read 
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept 
public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”13 
But obscenity is not the only example, and the local tailoring is not always simply 
rhetorical—sometimes federal constitutional rules outright incorporate state and 
local law. The “property” protected by the Fifth Amendment, for example, is 
 
 6. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“State courts also have a freer hand in doing something the Supreme 
Court cannot: allowing local conditions and traditions to affect their interpretation of a constitutional guarantee 
and the remedies imposed to implement that guarantee.”). 
 7. Id. at 196 (“Why not offer a course on American constitutional law, one that covers all facets of the 
topic?”). One area of possible overlap, which I and others have explored elsewhere, and which Sutton describes 
in his book, is the degree to which federal constitutional doctrine can and sometimes should incorporate lessons 
from state constitutional law. Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal 
Constitution, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2011); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Con-
stitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 366 (2011).  
 8. See infra Section II.A. 
 9. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (striking down 
Seattle plan for lack of compelling interest, but recognizing that remedying the effects of past intentional dis-
crimination would be compelling) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)). 
 10. See infra Section II.B. 
 11. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 18. 
 12. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 13. Id. at 32; see also Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that this test “permit[s] 
differing levels of obscenity regulation in such diverse communities as Kerrville and Houston, Texas”). 
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defined in large part by state law, which varies in potentially significant ways 
from place to place.14 
Finally, there are state and local variations that we might think about as 
“adjacent” to a federal constitutional right. The federal constitution protects fun-
damental rights to consensual sex,15 same-sex marriage,16 and abortion.17 But 
that does not mean that states have identical legal regimes regarding sex (age of 
consent, for example18), marriage (cousins, for example19), or abortion (waiting 
periods, for example20). Some of these variations can be explained on the basis 
that, for example, the constitution is silent regarding marriages to double-first 
cousins,21 and so state experimentation22 and variation is to be permitted or even 
encouraged. But of course, bans on same-sex marriage (or, for that matter, on 
handguns) did not raise constitutional questions—until they did.23 The question 
is whether the federal constitution is implicated by such rules, which do after all 
restrict people’s ability to engage in what otherwise seems to be constitutionally 
protected conduct.  
The point should not be overstated. These could be the exceptions that 
prove the general rule that—granting that factual differences may dictate differ-
ent results in different places—federal constitutional rights are, by and large, 
 
 14. See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. As noted below, infra note 688 and accompanying text, 
that variation might not always amount to much in practice. Maureen E. Brady, Property Convergence in Takings 
Law, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 719–23 (2019) (collecting cases); see also Maureen Brady, The Domino Effect in 
State Takings Law: A Response to 51 Imperfect Solutions, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1455.  
 15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 16. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 17. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 18. States vary between sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen as the age of consent, but states also vary as to 
the allowable age difference between parties under the age of consent. Colorado sets its age of consent at seven-
teen, but allows someone who is fifteen to have sex with someone who is no more than four years older, and a 
person who is seventeen can only have sex with someone no more than ten years older.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
3-402. Hawaii sets its age of consent at sixteen, but allows a five-year age difference for persons aged fourteen 
or above. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1)(c)(i) (2019). Idaho sets the age of consent at eighteen, but only consid-
ers it statutory rape where the perpetrator is more than three years older than someone who is sixteen or seventeen. 
IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(2019).   
 19. Some states allow first cousins to marry.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.021 (2019) (allowing first 
cousin marriage).  Others void such marriages. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-6 (2019) (voiding marriages 
between first cousins). And still others take the odd position of allowing first cousin marriages while criminaliz-
ing sex between first cousins. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.201 (West 2019) (not voiding first cousin marriages); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02(a)(6) (West 2019) (criminalizing sex between first cousins).  
 20. Some states, such as California, have no waiting period, while others, like South Dakota, have a 72-
hour waiting period and do not allow weekends or holidays to count towards that wait time. CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 123460 et seq. (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56 (2019). 
 21. See infra note 77. If sisters marry brothers, the offspring are double-first cousins.  
 22. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labor-
atory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Arizona 
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579–80, 582 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441, 
446 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 
356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 23. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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identically applied across the country. And in the vast run of cases, location prob-
ably and properly has little impact on result. The point is emphatically not that 
states or local governments can or should be able to exempt themselves from 
core constitutional guarantees, but that in some circumstances—particularly at 
the “margins” of constitutional rights (imagine the double-first cousin case24)—
there might be room for variation. My much more limited suggestion is that fed-
eral law is not always as uniform as Sutton’s account might indicate. 
One way to dissolve this disagreement would be to show that the differ-
ences are semantic, or that they ultimately boil down to questions of framing. As 
Judge Sutton has observed in other contexts, “[l]evel of generality is destiny in 
interpretive disputes[.]”25 One might say, for example, that courts confronting a 
due process or takings challenge would apply the same doctrines in North Caro-
lina that they would in Virginia, and the fact that some kinds of property are 
available in one state and not the other is a distinction without a difference—just 
a demonstration of the obvious and unremarkable point that application of an 
identical legal rule to two different factual scenarios could lead to different re-
sults. With this, too, I agree in large part. As with nearly any legal debate, the 
higher one goes up the ladder of abstraction, the more likely one is to find com-
mon ground. But relegating differences in state law to the level of fact is not, I 
think, consistent with Sutton’s project (or mine)—which is to take that law seri-
ously as part of the American constitutional project. If differences in state con-
stitutional law matter—and we emphatically agree that they do—then distinc-
tions in federal law that result from those differences must matter as well.  
Moreover, whatever one thinks about the actual degree of variation within 
federal constitutional law, one must confront Sutton’s normative argument that 
the U.S. Supreme Court not only “cannot” but “should not” tailor constitutional 
rights at the local level.26 Here too, the case is complicated. Many of the argu-
ments that Sutton makes in favor of the diversity of state constitutional law apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to federal constitutional doctrine.27 It too can be made respon-
sive to state and local identity while also guaranteeing a universal (and nation-
wide) floor of individual liberty. It might provide (as Sutton says of state consti-
tutional law) “a meaningful source of rights protection, but not a one-size-fits-all 
source of rights protection,” and “might offer a useful way to handle our coun-
try’s differences of opinion and a useful process for ameliorating and eventually 
resolving them.”28 
And yet local tailoring of federal constitutional rights can also impose con-
siderable costs. The federal constitution must surely impose some degree of uni-
formity. It is, at the very least, awkward to have otherwise-identical cases de-
cided differently in different parts of the country. Moreover, for some of the same 
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
26. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 18. 
27. See, e.g., id. at 16–19. 
28. Id. at ix.
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reasons that they may be good laboratories of experimentation, states can be po-
litically and legally volatile—a possibility the Framers suspected29—which has 
sometimes led to abuse of minority groups.30 
This leads to another set of questions, with which this Essay will con-
clude.31 Whether one celebrates variation within state constitutional law (in Sut-
ton’s account) or federal constitutional law (in mine), the types and degree of 
variation must be limited. Not every imaginable variation is a “solution,” imper-
fect or otherwise. Some are simply inconsistent with the American constitutional 
project. What, then, are the limits? Or, to split the question into two: how much 
and what kinds of variation are permissible within federal constitutional law?  
It is possible to map those questions onto at least three underlying dichoto-
mies32: between constitutional interpretation and constitutional implementation 
(or “construction”), between cores and peripheries of rights, and between cer-
tainties and ambiguities. In all three of those dichotomies, the argument for var-
iation applies to the second part of the pair—to implementing doctrines, not de-
termining meaning; to tailoring at the peripheries, not altering cores; and to 
preserving room for development in areas where the answers are unclear.  
This short Essay cannot hope to provide even imperfect solutions to these 
challenges. It will, however, attempt to flesh out the descriptive claim, the nor-
mative argument, and the framing question. Descriptively, the claim is that U.S. 
federal constitutional law is disuniform in ways that matter. Normatively, the 
claim is that this disuniformity has both benefits and costs. And the framework 
is an initial attempt to get traction on evaluating the kinds and degrees of ac-
ceptable variation.  
One final word on the framing of the project. Sutton’s book directly con-
fronts the deep divisions in American life and politics; it is framed as a partial 
(and, of course, imperfect) solution to them. This is not a headline-chasing pro-
ject—he has been pursuing it for decades. But in the past few years, it has been 
hard not to consider the possibility that the federal fabric itself is coming apart. 
My minor intervention is an attempt to help preserve it, largely using Sutton’s 
playbook.   
 
 29. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet 1961) (“The influence 
of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general con-
flagration through the other States.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 5, at 46; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. This is not an exclusive list; there are other ways to evaluate disuniformity. One might, for example, 
focus on areas in which norms and rules are in the process of shifting. Or, as Jud Campbell’s contribution to this 
symposium suggests, one might expect (and want) a fair bit of uniformity in the “declaration” of rights—those 
based on general law—even though, as Campbell notes, the details of implementation vary from place to place. 
Jud Campbell, The Realist Transformation of Constitutional Rights, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1433, 1440. 
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II. THE FACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY  
The distinction Sutton draws is between fifty-one imperfect solutions on 
the one hand and a single imperfect one on the other. But is federal constitutional 
law really so monolithic?  
To the degree that the question has surfaced in scholarship and caselaw, it 
has traditionally been in the midst of debates that constitutional rules might apply 
differently to different levels of government—federal, state, and local, for exam-
ple. Some scholars (present company included33) have argued that even federal 
constitutional rights can and sometimes should be tailored to sub-national cir-
cumstances.34 This would of course entail variation in the application of a federal 
principle throughout the country. The normative dimension of that debate will 
be addressed in Part III. The immediate question is how much of a departure it 
would be from current practice.  
Sutton’s suggestion is that it would be a big one, since federal constitutional 
principles not only should not, but do not vary from place to place.35 He is in 
good company. The Supreme Court itself has said as much,36 and (as noted 
above) the proposition might be unassailably true, depending on the level of gen-
erality at which one presents it.  
But like other truisms of American constitutional doctrine—that fundamen-
tal rights receive strict scrutiny, for example37—the reality is more nuanced. In 
important ways, federal constitutional law is not uniform. The application of con-
stitutional principles can vary considerably depending on where one is located 
within what John Marshall called our “vast republic, from the St. Croix to the 
Gulph of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.”38 
Some of this lumpiness is itself textually specified.39 The Constitution’s 
Seat of Government Clause, to take one obvious example, gives Congress broad 
power in that particular location.40 Likewise, congressional authority under the 
Territories Clause means that millions of American citizens living in the territo-
 
 33. Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 126 (2013). 
 34. See generally Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005) (noting that “a given constitutional principle may apply differently” to 
“different levels of government”); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of 
Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1813 (2004) (“[T]he predominantly local character of Religion 
Clause disputes should have theoretical and doctrinal significance.”). 
 35. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 40. 
 36. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights 
guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ . . . the same constitutional standards apply against 
both the State and Federal Governments.”) (footnote omitted). 
 37. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227 
(2006). 
 38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819). 
 39. See generally Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168 (2011).  
 40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.  
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ries (four million in Puerto Rico alone) face a radically different set of govern-
ment powers,41 and are equipped with a very different set of rights.42 As Allan 
Erbsen notes, “[s]patial precision is essential because knowing how the Consti-
tution addresses a particular problem often requires knowing where the problem 
arises. The text remains the same, but its significance varies as one travels be-
tween, for example, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guantá-
namo Bay, and Afghanistan.”43 
Of course, one might concede these examples, or even say—expressio 
unius—that uniformity is the rule unless the text of the Constitution says other-
wise. But, as the rest of this Part aims to show, variation is not limited to these 
pockets of specified governing structures. As Richard Thompson Ford notes, 
“when the stakes of a jurisdiction are in question . . . one cannot simply refer to 
lines on a map. . . . [W]e must constantly remind ourselves that jurisdiction is 
itself a set of practices.”44 Doing so can help illuminate a wide range of issues, 
questions, and possibilities about the relationship between law and place.45 
 
 41. Whether those powers include the authority to expel or “de-annex” Puerto Rico, or to resist a claim to 
statehood, is an important and difficult question. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the 
Right of Accession, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 229, 233 (2018); Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Ex-
pansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 815 (2005). 
 42. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016) (denying Puerto 
Rico access to bankruptcy options that are available to states); Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 
1868 (2016) (denying double jeopardy claim that would succeed in states); Mitu Gulati & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 157 (2017). 
 43. Erbsen, supra note 39, at 1169. Indeed, the fifty existing state constitutions are not the only nonfederal 
constitutions within the American system. Puerto Rico has a constitution as well, one whose provisions govern 
4 million American citizens (more than about half of the states). P.R. CONST. art. 1, §1 (“The political power [of 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico] emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their 
will, within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of 
America.”); ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS: DEFIANT VISIONS OF POWER AND 
COMMUNITY (2014). And, of course, there are subnational constitutions which, for one reason or another, never 
quite took off. See, e.g., Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-
731e (2006)) (providing “for the organization of a constitutional government by the people of Puerto Rico”).  
 44. Richard Thompson Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 856 
(1999).  
 45. For a sampling of scholarship addressing the relationship between place and constitutional principles, 
see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 
(2008); Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (2014); Paul Horwitz, The Religious Ge-
ography of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 295 (2014); Mark D. Rosen, The Radical 
Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927, 930 
(2002); Schragger, supra note 34; see also Mae Kuykendall, Restatement of Place, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 757, 757 
(2014) (“Place, as a factor that is present in law but often not fully seen, has not been recognized for its theoretical 
importance as a viewpoint from which to understand the functioning and implications of many areas of the law.”); 
Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT’L. 421, 427–34 
(2007) (“The above statistics on the marginal status of geography in the United States are the result of an aca-
demic murder mystery story: the elimination of U.S. geography departments at many elite universities between 
1948 and 1987.”). 
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A. Different Results 
Sometimes the application of a single constitutional principle will lead to 
different results in different places—accepting in one place what elsewhere 
would be unconstitutional. 
Consider what we might think of as remedial variations. Race-conscious 
student assignment plans might be unconstitutional in Seattle, but constitutional 
in another city that does have a history of explicit, state-enforced segregation.46 
Congress’s Section Five power can abrogate state sovereign immunity, but only 
when it does so in a way that is congruent and proportional to an identified con-
stitutional harm47—a recipe for geographic tailoring. Along similar lines, the Su-
preme Court struck down the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act pre-
cisely because it was not geographically tailored enough.48 
One might dismiss these as not involving true differences, but simply an 
application of the same principle—de jure segregation can justify affirmative ac-
tion, for example—leading to different results because of different facts. The 
prohibition on murder is universal; the fact that some defendants are guilty and 
some are not is no evidence to the contrary. This leads back to the levels of gen-
erality issue, and again I am happy to concede the point. But no matter how one 
defines it, these results demonstrate that the results of constitutional cases do 
vary based on “the local traditions, cultures, or history of one State, one region 
of the country, or one group of citizens.”49 
Such traditions can impact the scope and strength of federal constitutional 
rights in the other direction as well: by effectively narrowing them through def-
erence to particular institutions, whether they be military bases50 or universi-
ties.51 These are not precisely geographic distinctions, but they do show varia-
tion in federal constitutional rights. Students do not entirely lose their federal 
constitutional rights “at the schoolhouse gate[,]”52 but they do lose something. 
Prisoners retain their fundamental rights to free exercise of religion, free speech, 
and the like, but those rights have very different contours behind bars.53 
 
 46. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). 
 47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522 (1997). 
 48. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 529 (2013). 
 49. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 50. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836–38 (1976). 
 51. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003), (invoking and 
relying on the principle that “universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition”); Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (majority opinion of Powell, J.). For a critical ac-
count of institutional tailoring in free speech cases, see Scott Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners, Oh, 
My!: A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 
1635, 1658 (2007). For more sympathetic accounts, see PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 
(2012); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 822 (2008). 
 52. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”); see also JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 426–27 (2018). 
 53. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803. 
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In these cases, it is not so easy to say that the same principle leads to dif-
ferent results in application, because courts have specifically noted that the stand-
ards differ—some rules are constitutional in schools that would not be else-
where.54 Likewise, some constitutional rules are articulated in such a way that 
differing facts on the ground will lead to different results. The permissibility of 
time, place, and manner restrictions will vary depending on context.55 The fact 
that a police stop “occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant con-
textual considerations in a Terry analysis.”56 Even the basic structure of strict 
scrutiny can lead to different results, since different governments have more or 
less compelling interests in certain regulations.57 
These contextual constitutional rules permit variation throughout the coun-
try, but again one might simply answer that they are pitched at a high level of 
generality—they are evidence, in other words, of the “federalism discount” that 
Sutton and others have described.58 But in other places, constitutional law is 
quite specific about variation, not only regarding the facts on the ground, but in 
terms of legal rules themselves.59 
B. Different Doctrinal Definitions 
Other variations within federal constitutional law depend less on factual 
distinctions than on definitional ones—not just with regard to the kinds of con-
stitutionally specified distinctions listed above (territories, seat of government, 
etc.), but also in judge-made doctrines. Specifically, some federal constitutional 
rules incorporate subnational legal rules that themselves vary, sometimes in sig-
nificant ways, from place to place.  
One obvious example is obscenity doctrine. The first prong of the test for 
obscenity asks “whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest.”60 In applying those community standards, a “juror is entitled to draw 
on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or 
vicinage from which he comes.”61 The result, of course, is that speech that is 
 
 54. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 n.6. 
 55. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988). 
 56. Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 
(1972)). But see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“We thought it obvious that the Fourth Amend-
ment’s meaning did not change with local law enforcement practices . . .”). 
 57. William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Should Differences in a 
States’ Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 79, 96 (2013) (noting that compelling interest 
requirement might lead to different results in different states).  
 58. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978); Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1979 (2008). 
 59. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).  
 60. Id. at 24 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
 61. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974). 
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constitutionally protected in one area of the country may be unprotected in oth-
ers.62 
The point should not be overstated—the degree to which such variation is 
desirable, and how much weight it receives in practice, is a matter of considera-
ble debate.63 The point here is simply that, as a matter of definition, the federal 
constitutional rule incorporates local variation.  
Consider another example. The “property” protected by the due process and 
takings clauses is a product of subnational law. Indeed, the Court has specified 
that such constitutionally protected entitlements are “not created by the Consti-
tution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules 
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”64 
This can lead to different results in different places. In Town of Castle Rock, 
Colorado v. Gonzales, for example, the Court noted that “in the context of the 
present case, the central state-law question is whether Colorado law gave re-
spondent a right to police enforcement of the restraining order.”65 The Court 
concluded that it did not.66 But in other places, similar claims involving protec-
tive orders might succeed.67 
Again, the degree of resulting variation might be limited in practice, despite 
the conceptual space left open. Molly Brady has detailed the degree to which 
courts in takings cases actually tend to treat state property rules as if they emerge 
from same kind of shared general law.68 My modest goal here is to suggest that 
the law tolerates disuniformity and—even if only in limited ways—sometimes 
embraces it. 
Such diversity can be outcome-determinative in cases where there is “play 
in the joints” of the federal constitution, as was the case in Locke v Davey.69 
There, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a Washington law that 
denied state funding for vocational training at religious institutions, basing its 
decision in part on the fact that “the differently worded Washington Constitution 
draws a more stringent line than that drawn by the United  States Constitution.”70 
 
 62. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 (contrasting “Maine or Mississippi” with “Las Vegas, or New York City”); see 
also Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that this test “permit[s] differing levels of ob-
scenity regulation in such diverse communities as Kerrville and Houston, Texas”). 
 63. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 589 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that standards should be based on the “Nation’s adult community taken 
as a whole” rather than “geographically separate local areas”). 
 64. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
577 (1972)). 
 65. 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005); see also Blocher, supra note 33, at 126 (discussing this example).  
 66. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 764–65.  
 67. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed. Appx. 340, 345–47 (4th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Castle Rock). 
 68. Brady, Property Convergence in Takings Law, supra note 14, at 705–22. 
 69. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004).  
 70. Id. at 722–23. 
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C. Near-Constitutional Distinctions 
A final category of constitutional distinctions is somewhat different: it in-
cludes variations that are not explicitly recognized as such—at least not yet—but 
which nonetheless shape, sometimes fundamentally, people’s abilities to exer-
cise their fundamental rights.  
The federal constitution generally protects the rights of consenting adults 
to engage in consensual sexual activity71 and to marry.72 But that does not mean 
that states have identical legal regimes when it comes to what kinds of sex, even 
between consenting adults, are legally permissible. A handful of states retain the 
“heartbalm” torts, for example, which subject people to legal sanction for engag-
ing in consensual sexual activity.73 
The federal constitution likewise provides the fundamental right to mar-
riage.74 But, even after Obergefell, states have different rules about precisely 
who can marry.75 In some, first cousins are prohibited from marrying;76 in others, 
first cousins are permitted, but double-first cousins are not.77 For that matter, 
states have different rules about voter registration, voter identification, abortion 
waiting periods, and a host of other rules that impact people’s ability to exercise 
their most fundamental constitutional rights.78 
One might expect, then, a court reviewing one of those laws—a Lawrence-
based challenge to a heartbalm tort regime, for example, or an Obergefell-based 
challenge to the prohibition on marriage between double first cousins—to invoke 
the same principle from Skinner v. Oklahoma: “We are dealing here with legis-
lation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procre-
ation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”79 After all, 
punishing someone for engaging in sexual activity undoubtedly “involves . . . 
procreation”; a double-first-cousin ban “involves . . . [m]arriage.”80 To the de-
gree that states are permitted to vary along those dimensions, then, we may be 
seeing variation within federal fundamental rights.  
One might remain unconvinced that these examples actually do show a di-
versity in federal constitutional law. Perhaps all they demonstrate is the unre-
 
 71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 72. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 73. See H. Hunter Bruton, Note, The Questionable Constitutionality of Curtailing Cuckolding: Alienation-
of-Affection and Criminal-Conversation Torts, 65 DUKE L.J. 755, 760 (2016). 
 74. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.  
 75. Id.; see, e.g., sources cited infra notes 76–77.  
 76. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-101(a)(iii) (West 2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. §48-2-302(a) (West 
2019). 
 77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-3 (West 2019) (“All marriages between any two persons nearer of kin 
than first cousins, or between double first cousins . . . shall be void.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NCLS (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx; GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Counseling 
and Waiting Periods for Abortion (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-
and-waiting-periods-abortion. 
 79. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 80. See id. 
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markable fact that laws vary from place to place, and that toleration of such di-
versity—even when those laws have some superficial connection to the exercise 
of a constitutional right—is itself a demonstration that they do not have anything 
to do with constitutional law. It is like observing that couples seeking to exercise 
their fundamental right to marry will, in different states, obtain marriage licenses 
from clerks who themselves will vary in job title, compensation, or even appear-
ance. Sure, they are operating within a kind of constitutional space—the right to 
marry cannot take place without them—but the existence and extent of these var-
iations is strong evidence that there is not a federal constitutional right at play.   
It is true that not all differences in state practice necessarily demonstrate 
variation in federal constitutional rights. Some simply show that states vary in 
their treatment of those things that lie outside the boundaries of federal constitu-
tional rights. But we should not be too quick to dismiss these variations as not 
involving—to use Sutton’s phrase again—“the making of American constitu-
tional law.”81 Especially when we think about that law functionally rather than 
formally,82 these kinds of variations have constitutional valence. To define them 
as non-constitutional precisely because of their diversity is simply to assume an 
answer about whether federal constitutional law can be diverse.  
The point of this Part is relatively straightforward: as a matter of existing 
doctrine and practice, federal constitutional law varies from place to place. A 
federal constitutional claim that succeeds in one place might fail in another, 
thanks to varying facts, varying law, and even varying near-constitutional prac-
tices. We should not, therefore, be too quick to think of federal constitutional law 
as a single, uniform imperfect solution. Whether it should be is the next logical 
question.  
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY
It is beyond the scope or ambition of this paper to provide a full-throated 
defense of variation within federal constitutional rights law. My more limited 
goal is to survive a scholarly motion to dismiss in making the case that such 
variation should not be rejected out of hand. It is, to adopt Mark Rosen’s frame 
in arguing for a different kind of constitutional tailoring, a “surprisingly strong 
case,”83 albeit a preliminary one.  
A. Benefits
The possible benefits of subnational legal approaches are not only consid-
erable, but are in fact too voluminous to discuss in any detail here—nearly any 
discussion of federalism involves those themes. 
81. SUTTON, supra note 1. 
82. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 410 (2007) (proposing 
a functional definition of the American “constitution,” and arguing that it “consists of a much wider range of 
legal materials than the document ratified in 1789 and its subsequent amendments”). 
83. See generally Rosen, supra note 34, at 1516 (noting that “a given constitutional principle may apply
differently” to “different levels of government[.]”). 
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It seems straightforward enough, for example, that not all policy questions 
should be resolved at the federal level. As David Barron notes: 
There is a value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discretion to 
make the decisions that their residents wish them to make. The value in-
heres in the traditional advantages that attend decentralization. These in-
clude more participatory and responsive government; more diversity of 
policy experimentation; more flexibility in responding to changing circum-
stances; and more diffusion of governmental power, which in turn checks 
tyranny.84 
The question then becomes whether those policy differences can or should 
be refracted in federal constitutional law. 
As noted in part above, there are good reasons to accept that they are and 
should be. The policy-relevant differences in circumstances will almost certainly 
also be imbricated with the strength of the government’s interest in regulation—
what is “compelling” in one place might be only “important” in another. Bill 
Marshall and others have argued as much of campaign finance regulation, for 
example,85 and Christopher Serkin has raised similar points in the takings con-
text.86 
Sutton’s description of Rodriguez is good evidence in this regard.87 As he 
notes, Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion focused on the challenges of convincing 
the Court “to define a right and create a remedy that it could apply uniformly to 
fifty sets of state laws, 248 million people . . . and nearly 16,000 school dis-
tricts . . . .”88 Powell noted that school funding depends on “expertise and . . . 
familiarity with local problems.”89 He went on to say: “The very complexity of 
the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system sug-
gests that ‘there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of 
solving them.’”90 
These arguments for decentralization need not be naked policy arguments, 
though—they come clothed in the garb of federalism. Since states are guaranteed 
a constitutional role in our system, they must be given some leeway to determine 
their own fates, not just collectively, but individually.91 (That point alone is im-
portant: a simple federal v. state divide would suggest a single imperfect solution 
 
 84. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2001). 
 85. Marshall, supra note 57, at 100 (“The political cultures of the states are different, and applying a one-
size-fits-all prescription to the constitutionality of campaign finance rules undercuts both this reality and sound 
principles and protections of federalism.”); see Justin Weinstein-Tulla, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 747, 798 (2016). 
 86. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings 
Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1626 (2006) (arguing that “takings by different levels of government implicate 
different theoretical and doctrinal concerns. The animating intuition is that a different answer to the takings puz-
zle might apply to federal actions—like wetlands regulation—than to local actions—like a town’s denial of a 
building permit—even if the effect on a particular property owner is substantially the same.”). 
 87. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 35–36.  
 88. Id. at 36. 
 89. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973). 
 90. Id. at 42 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546–47 (1972)).  
 91. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
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against another single imperfect solution, albeit one with 50 authors.) The com-
mitment need not be deontological; it can also provide utilitarian benefits like 
experimentation, competition,92 preservation of distinct identities,93 and so on.   
Such arguments have not always carried the day in constitutional rights law. 
It has sometimes been argued, for example, that states should receive greater 
deference than the federal government when their laws are constitutionally chal-
lenged.94 But as Sutton notes, “the U.S. Supreme Court’s multidecade experi-
ment with dual standards for Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the state and 
federal governments did not end well, with the Court ultimately collapsing the 
two.”95 If anything, the difference persists but in the other direction—empirical 
studies of free speech96 and Second Amendment cases97 have found that state 
laws tend to get struck down at higher rates than their federal counterparts. 
The argument here is different: Not that state governments should, qua 
level of government, get greater deference, but that the constitutional status of a 
regulation—whether federal, state, or local—should sometimes, and to some de-
gree, be evaluated in terms of local circumstances. This could even help over-
come the “federalism discount” that Sutton and others have noted arises in cases 
where the U.S. Supreme Court ratchets down constitutional protection because 
it must preserve room for state-level variation.98 
It should be emphasized that, fundamentally, none of the preceding argu-
ments is original. Even in the narrower category of legal interpretation (as op-
posed to rulemaking and the like) the benefits of local control have been high-
lighted in a variety of contexts, including both constitutional99 and statutory.100 
 
 92. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 (1956) (describ-
ing model in which citizen-consumers will move to communities whose bundle of government services they 
prefer). 
 93. See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political 
Culture in the American Federal System,” (Feb. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552866. 
 94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[N]ot all of the strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon Congress are carried over against the States 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203–204 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (ob-
scenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503–504 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294–95 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (group libel laws). 
 95. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 185 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961)).  
 96. Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 155 (2009) (finding that courts ap-
plying strict scrutiny in free speech cases upheld federal speech laws in 56% of cases, state speech laws in 24% 
of cases, and local speech laws in a remarkably low 3% of cases). 
 97. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L. J. 1433, 1505 (2018) (finding, based on regression analysis, that “chal-
lenges to federal laws, as opposed to state laws, correspond with a 63 percent decrease in the odds of success”). 
 98. See supra note 58 and sources cited therein. 
 99. See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 33, at 127; Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 
369, 370 (2018). 
 100. Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 903 (2013) (arguing “[T]he 
(concededly modest) accountability available for local judicial performance, combined with the possibility for 
careful state supervision of ‘localist’ judicial action, supports giving local courts more discretion in interpreting 
both local ordinances and state statutes.”). 
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Perhaps more to the point, the argument here echoes what Sutton himself says 
about state constitutional law:  
In a country that has come to believe deeply in judicially protected rights 
but has come to disagree fiercely about which rights to recognize, a re-
newed focus on state constitutions as a meaningful source of rights protec-
tion, but not a one-size-fits-all source of rights protection, might offer a 
useful way to handle our country’s differences of opinion and a useful pro-
cess for ameliorating and eventually resolving them.101 
If federal constitutional law itself were not so one-size-fits-all, then it, too, 
might contribute to that project.  
Quoting again from the book: “Still less is there reason to think that a highly 
generalized guarantee, such as a prohibition on ‘unreasonable’ searches, would 
have just one meaning over a range of differently situated sovereigns.”102 Sutton 
uses this line in the course of criticizing state courts for interpreting their consti-
tutions in lockstep with the federal constitution.103 But might it also be a critique 
of the federal constitution?  
B. Costs 
Of course, as with variation in state constitutional law, variation within the 
federal system also comes with costs and risks. Again, many of them are pre-
cisely the same in both contexts.  
The Framers themselves recognized that the threat of faction may be more 
significant at the state level than at the federal level.104 Deviations from a single 
nationwide rule could therefore end up denying robust federal constitutional pro-
tections to those who need them most—discrete and insular minorities faced with 
repressive or unresponsive state and local governments, for example. The history 
of racial discrimination is, here as for other federalism arguments,105 the most 
notable ghost.  
States were hardly the only bad actors in that story—in fact, at times federal 
law stood in the way of progressive state-level change106—and in the present 
moment, progressives have increasingly taken up the mantles of federalism and 
 
 101. SUTTON, supra note 1, at ix.  
 102. Id. at 174–75 (“So too of many other generally phrased constitutional guarantees found in the federal 
and state constitutions: ‘due process,’ ‘equal protection of the laws,’ ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’ ‘free 
speech,’ ‘free exercise of religion,’ and ‘takings’ of property . . . .”).  
 103. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 104. Madison, supra note 29 at 78; see also David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in En-
forcing the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2220 (2006) (“[T]he standard view is that the higher up one goes, 
the less passion and the more reason enters into interpretation.”); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power 
Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1584–85 (1977).  
 105. Gerken, supra note 5, at 46–47 (“The nationalists’ objection to conventional federalism typically takes 
one of two forms. The first is a worry that local power is a threat to minority rights. The second is a related 
concern about what we might loosely analogize to the principal-agent problem—the fear that state decisions that 
fly in the face of deeply held national norms will be insulated from reversal. Both find their strongest examples 
in the tragic history of slavery and Jim Crow.”). 
 106. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 650 (1842) (finding that federal Fugitive Slave Act preempted 
Pennsylvania law prohibiting return of escaped slaves). 
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local control.107 Some of that is sheer opportunism, of course, as is conservative 
abandonment of federalism when inconvenient. That is hardly news.  
Whatever the partisan vectors, arguing that federalism concerns should 
shape constitutional rights law does raise a fundamental discomfort. Considering 
(and criticizing) the Court’s refusal to take seriously the argument that states 
have unique political cultures that may call for different constitutional analysis 
of campaign finance laws, Bill Marshall nonetheless acknowledges that “it is at 
least awkward that a provision found constitutional in Montana could be uncon-
stitutional in New York.”108 As explained in Part II, existing doctrine already 
does this to some degree, and as explained in Part III.A, some scholars and judges 
have endorsed it.109 
Still, the “awkward” results should not be underestimated, and in some sets 
of cases they may be too awkward to bear. Consider the subset of federal consti-
tutional cases in which the federal government itself is the defendant. If the re-
sults in those cases are allowed to vary across the country, especially assuming 
the availability of nationwide injunctions,110 the legal system’s internal torque 
would be significant to say the least. 
IV. HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?  
The preceding arguments—one descriptive and one normative—are largely 
independent. One might deny that federal constitutional law actually is diverse, 
and yet agree that it should be (or vice versa). But unless one rejects both of the 
first two arguments entirely, another question arises: How much and in what 
ways should federal constitutional law depart from uniformity? 
This is an impossible question to answer in the abstract. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the question of whether and how any particular constitutional right 
should be tailored is ultimately a specific and normative one.111 Variation could 
be justified on the basis of history, policy, culture, or cost-benefit analysis, de-
pending on the right and the various contexts in which it applies. That said, it is 
possible to identify at least three lenses through which the type and extent of 
permissible or desirable variation might be identified.  
A. Interpretation vs. Implementation 
Scholars of constitutional doctrine have often focused on the role it plays 
in implementing constitutional provisions. As Richard Fallon explains, judges 
“frequently must function as practical lawyers and . . . craft doctrines and tests” 
 
 107. Lenny Mendonca & Laura D. Tyson, The Progressive Resurgence of Federalism, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV.: GOV’T, https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_progressive_resurgence_of_federalism (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2020). 
 108. Marshall, supra note 57, at 98–99. 
 109. See supra Section III.A. and accompanying text. 
 110. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 418 (2019); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020). 
 111. Blocher, supra note 33, at 88; see also Rosen, supra note 34, at 1516–17; Schragger, supra note 34, at 
1819 n.29. 
 
1496 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2020 
that are influenced, but not “perfectly determined,” by the meaning of the Con-
stitution.112 That meaning, in turn, is identified through interpretation. Some 
scholars, especially originalists, have posited a difference between interpretation 
and construction, with the former referring to the semantic meaning of a consti-
tutional provision and the latter to the constitutional doctrine that implements 
it.113 
One way to understand the practice of (and arguments for) variation in fed-
eral constitutional law is that it reflects differences in implementation, not in in-
terpretation. After all, the examples are nearly all doctrinal, not derived directly 
from the text of the document.114 Perhaps the meaning of the Due Process Clause 
is the same nationwide, but the implementation of that right in judge-made doc-
trine can and should take account of variations in what counts as property.  
My own view is that the distinction here—whether one considers it as being 
between interpretation and implementation, interpretation and construction, 
meaning and doctrine—is appealing, though sometimes hard to pin down. It 
seems intuitively correct that the meaning of a federal constitutional right must 
be nationally uniform, even if that meaning leads to different legal results in dif-
ferent places. Many of the examples discussed in Part II, for example, might be 
understood as falling within the category of implementation—a uniform guaran-
tee of due process, for example, that cashes out differently depending on back-
ground principles of state law.115 
The challenge, to return to Judge Sutton’s insight from another context, is 
the level of generality problem. But the fact that it is hard to draw lines between 
one level and another does not mean that there are no lines to be drawn, nor that 
there is no value in saying that the meaning of a constitutional provision is uni-
form, even as its implementation changes. Again, the statement of Sutton’s with 
which I am attempting to quibble is that the U.S. Supreme Court “cannot, or at 
least should not, premise an interpretation of the National Constitution on the 
local traditions, cultures, or history of one State, one region of the country, or 
one group of citizens.”116 Our disagreement largely dissolves—or at least is re-
framed in a useful way—if “interpretation” can usefully be separated from “im-
plementation.” 
  
 
 112. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2001). 
 113. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 
99–100 (2010); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 
128 (2010). 
 114. The textually specified variations are of course an exception. See supra notes 32–45 and accompanying 
text. 
 115. See supra Section II.B and accompanying text. 
 116. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added).  
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B. Cores vs. Peripheries 
Another way to demarcate the appropriate scope of federal constitutional 
variation is by limiting it to the peripheries, rather than the cores of constitutional 
rights.  
Courts and scholars often use spatial metaphors like cores and peripheries 
when trying to draw lines between various levels of protection.117 In the Second 
Amendment context, for example, the Court has announced that the “central 
component” or “core lawful purpose” of the Second Amendment is freedom of 
self-defense,118 particularly in the home.119 Lower courts have often held that 
laws burdening that core are subject to a higher level of a scrutiny than those at 
the periphery—laws regulating public carrying of firearms, for example.120 
It is at these peripheries and penumbras that the kind of tailoring I describe 
here tends to operate, and might be most justifiable. No part of the country can 
or should be allowed to exempt itself from foundational constitutional rules, and 
perhaps (aside from the kinds of fact-based variation discussed in Part II.A121). 
we should be especially wary of deviations in areas where federal doctrine al-
ready applies stringent rules: racial discrimination, political speech, and the like. 
But at the edges, the range of permissive legal interpretations is broader, and the 
possibilities for variation correspondingly more abundant. As Sutton notes, 
“[t]he U.S. Constitution and a state constitution may equally value free speech 
while having different understandings of commercial speech.” 122  And that 
makes sense, considering that commercial speech is given less constitutional pro-
tection than core political speech.123 
Of course, it is not always clear what falls within the core as opposed to the 
periphery of a constitutional right. The commercial speech example itself is the 
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subject of hot dispute, and might not be long-lived.124 I have no easy, trans-sub-
stantive solution to that question. But it is worth noting that Sutton does indi-
rectly point the way to one partial solution: state constitutional law. Courts in 
need of guidance about what rights are “core” to a guarantee could well look to 
state constitutional law for guidance, just as they can and sometimes do when 
identifying rights that are “deeply rooted” in the American constitutional tradi-
tion.125 
This is part of a broader point about the important ways in which federal 
constitutional law can and should learn from state constitutional law—a project 
I have pursued elsewhere.126 
C. Certainties vs. Open Questions 
A third way to cabin the breadth and depth of variation in federal constitu-
tional rights law would be to say that it is appropriate only where constitutional 
answers—“solutions,” in Sutton’s phrase—are uncertain.127 In situations where 
courts are divided about novel questions, the benefits of diverse approaches 
might be more substantial, or conversely, one might hesitate to embrace a single 
uniform rule.   
In this respect, it might be worth noting that Sutton frames his book as in-
volving “solutions” to “questions.”128 To this reader, at least, “solutions” calls to 
mind a pragmatist approach, one that accommodates the possibility of multiple 
satisfactory approaches. If instead one thinks of constitutional law as having right 
answers, then the very notion of “imperfect solutions” is anathema—courts 
should be correct, not effective.  
In general, my own view is similar to the one that Sutton’s choice of words 
implies: that many constitutional questions—and certainly the ones that most 
scholars and others have in mind—do not have single correct answers. But some 
do. There is no sense in a geographic diversity of approaches to the question of 
how old a Senator must be—the text is settled on that question. If and when the 
law is determinate and settled, uniformity should be the rule (subject, of course, 
to the fact- and law-based variations discussed in Part II). But where it is not, we 
might be more inclined to tolerate disuniformity as courts work their way to a 
single solution. As a matter of legal practice, this could have interesting and po-
tentially significant implications. If, for example, disuniformity were not only 
acknowledged but also tolerated or even sometimes celebrated, we might think 
very differently about circuit splits.129 
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This point is very similar to, but ultimately distinct from, the point about 
cores and peripheries. Cores tend to be settled; peripheries tend to involve more 
open questions. But some issues are settled as periphery—the status of commer-
cial speech, for example, is not so much unsettled as it is peripheral. Determining 
the proper type and degree of variation within federal constitutional rights law 
will depend on consideration of both characteristics.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The goals of this short Essay are limited: to describe and provide a prima 
facie defense of some degree of variation within federal constitutional law. As 
Judge Sutton puts it, “certain constitutional norms are beyond reproach. But even 
universal truths have local dialects.”130 State constitutional law discourse can 
hopefully be enriched in ways that capture those local dialects, and Sutton’s work 
will certainly help that linguistic development. But, as he notes, the obstacles are 
considerable.131 If those dialects are to be protected and preserved, state consti-
tutional law is not the only option. Federal constitutional law, too, can speak with 
accents. 
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